Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community

From 1973 to 1994, all forms of political participation, such as signing petitions and running for office, have declined significantly. Putnam observes that “more than a third of America’s civic infrastructure simply evaporated between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s” (43). What is more, the forms of political participation that depend on others, such as serving on a committee or working for a political party, have dropped more precipitously than activities that can be done alone, such as writing a letter. Political discourse is resultingly marked by incivility.

Voting, the “most common act of democratic citizenship” (31), has declined by 25% in presidential elections since the 1950s despite relaxed registration requirements, an influx of African American voters who were previously denied voting rights in the South, and a more educated populace. Putnam notes that much of this change is generational, with Baby Boomers and their children less likely to vote than older generations. For this reason, it is an intercohort change, with change varying in different age groups. Similarly, individuals born after 1964 are less knowledgeable about public affairs than previous generations were in that age category. Ironically, party organizations are stronger than in the past, but party identification has grown weaker. Many identify as independents, for example. It is increasingly rare for people to attend meetings and volunteer for a political party, a fact leading Putnam to conclude that financial capital has replaced social capital. Fewer people are actively participating in politics and instead are assuming the role of spectators.

In his observations about American democracy in the 1820s, Alexis de Tocqueville highlighted the tendency of Americans to join voluntary organizations. Indeed, there were an impressive number of community-based, church-based, and work-based organizations in this period. However, Putnam argues that “active involvement in face-to-face organizations has plummeted” (63) in the last third of the 20th century. With the exception of the Great Depression, involvement in voluntary organizations rose steadily in the first two-thirds of that century. Four independent sources of evidence, namely organizational records, survey reports, time diaries, and consumer expenditures, confirm these findings.

A review of membership records alone shows an increase in the number of voluntary associations, yet very few of these new organizations are member centered. Instead, they are professionally staffed, advocacy organizations often based in Washington, D.C. Membership simply requires writing a check and possibly reading an occasional newsletter. As a result, they are tertiary associations based on mailing lists and do not provide members with meaningful social capital. When Putnam delves beyond the membership figures, he discovers that active involvement of individuals in voluntary associations has declined. Between 1973 and 1994, the number of people who assumed any leadership role in a local organization declined by 50% (60). In the mid-1970s, nearly two-thirds of Americans attended club meetings while by 1999, two-thirds never attend such meetings. He cites the decline of the PTA in the last third of the century as one example. The overall decline accelerated after 1985. Again, Putnam cites generational replacement as a major source of these declines.

Religious institutions are the single most important source of social capital in the US, with nearly half of all associational memberships related to places of worship and half of all personal philanthropy and volunteering religious in nature (66). Religious communities foster civic skills, with attendees more likely to vote, volunteer, and have deep connections to their communities. While religious beliefs in the US have been stable over the last century, participation in religious institutions has declined approximately 10% from the mid-1970s to mid-1990s, and the slump accelerated from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s.

The decline is even greater for actual attendance and participation, which have dropped at least 25%. Hence, those claiming religious membership are not attending as often as before. The more demanding the form of participation, the greater the decline. All age cohorts have reduced involvement, but Baby Boomers and their children are less observant than previous generations.

More people are experimenting with different congregations, which makes them less committed to one particular community: Institutionalized religion is simply not as central to the lives of Baby Boomers as it was to their parents. To be sure, Putnam observes that the “pace and direction of change has varied markedly among different denominations” (75). Evangelical religions have grown while mainline Protestant denominations have declined, but historically, evangelicals have been less likely to participate in the broader community with their activities limited to co-religionists. Putnam thus sees growth among the most secular and the most orthodox, with the middle collapsing. As a result, religion is less effective as a foundation for civic engagement (78). He concludes that trends in religious participation replicate those in secular civic life: Religion flourished in the first two-thirds of the 20th century then experienced a decline, which is tied somewhat to generational replacement but also to other factors.

Work-related organizations, such as unions and professional organizations, have experienced the familiar pattern of modest growth in the beginning of the 20th century, rapid growth after World War II, followed by a plateau and then a sharp decline in the last third of the century (80), but evidence refutes the idea that social capital has migrated from communal associations to the workplace. Importantly, one-third of Americans are not employed and therefore have no workplace connections.

The rate of union membership has been in free fall for the last four decades of the 20th century. While Putnam acknowledges the role of structural changes, such as the shift toward a service economy and anti-labor policies, in this decline, he also argues that fewer workers expressed a desire to join a union between 1977 and 1991. Professional organizations have grown in whole numbers, but the percentage of professionals who join these organizations has declined. Thus, the rate of membership follows the same pattern.

Putnam notes that there is no evidence to support the idea that socializing informally in the workplace has increased in this period. To the contrary, workplace friends tend to be casual acquaintances, and trends in the workplace have arguably damaged social ties among workers. Specifically, downsizing, performance-based evaluations and pay, and outsourcing have increased workplace anxiety. In this environment, workers are more inclined to keep their “heads down” (88) and view their co-workers as competitors. Friendships also decrease with job instability. Indicative of this loneliness at work, job satisfaction declined 10% between 1972 and 1998. Putnam concludes that work lives need to be better integrated with communal and social ones to increase the social capital that comes from work-related connections.