Conjectures and Refutations

“Criticism of our conjectures is of decisive importance: by bringing out our mistakes it makes us understand the difficulties of the problem which we are trying to solve. This is how we become better acquainted with our problem, and able to propose more mature solutions: the very refutation of a theory—that is, of any serious tentative solution to our problem—is always a step forward that takes us nearer to the truth.”

The Importance of Refutation and Criticism is at the core of Popper’s thesis on scientific growth. In this quote, he explains why attempting to refute a theory helps to solve problems faster. This is because finding nothing but confirmations is unproductive to understanding the limits of a theory—only refutations help refine and improve them.

“It was precisely this fact—that they always fitted, that they were always confirmed—which in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact their weakness.”

Popper explains how he came to doubt the scientific status of certain theories, such as the Marxist theory of history, the Freudian theory of psychoanalysis, and the Adlerian theory of individual psychology. He realized that admirers of these theories see in every scenario a confirmation of their views instead of embracing The Importance of Refutation and Criticism to further refine their theories.

“Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem. And its description presupposes a descriptive language, with property words; it presupposes similarity and classification, which in its turn presupposes interests, point of view, and problems.”

This quote explains why Popper does not believe in the absolute objectivity of empirical evidence, arguing instead for The Role of Creativity and Tradition in Science as well. Empiricism asserts that the scientific process of experimentation, by virtue of resulting from careful observation and repeated testing, is the superior way of acquiring truths about the world. Popper argues that observation is far from being objective, as it requires human intention to even know what to observe. Popper does not mean to argue here that the scientific process is useless; rather, his purpose is to underline the importance of questioning how knowledge is generated.

“We are not students of some subject matter but students of problems. And problems may cut right across the border of any subject matter or discipline.”

Some philosophers have previously defended the idea that only empirical sciences are valuable for furthering the development of knowledge. In contrast, philosophy, which is founded on pure reasoning, is worthless. The context for this quote is Popper’s defense of philosophy (and by extension pure reason) as valuable for knowledge if used to solve problems. He argues that research should not be arbitrarily limited by a domain or field, since problems can occur across disciplines and both pure reasoning and empirical observation may be used while seeking for answers.

“[W]e are not passive receptors of sense data, but active organisms […] [B]y a great effort, by trying hard and making many mistakes, we may sometimes, if we are lucky, succeed in hitting upon a story, an explanation, which ‘saves the Phenomena’; perhaps by making a myth about ‘invisibles’, such as atoms or gravitational forces, which explain the visible […] [K]nowledge is an adventure of ideas.”

In this quote, Popper directly answers a long-standing question Kant had about epistemology. Kant spent a lot of time trying to understand how it was possible for successful conjectures to happen and how they led to the development of science. Popper’s answer describes a process of trial and error, in which many options are tested and discarded when refuted, and where The Role of Tradition and Creativity in Science is also acknowledged when crafting ambitious propositions.

“Within this rationalist tradition science is valued, admittedly, for its practical achievements; but it is even more highly valued for its informative content, and for its ability to free our minds from old beliefs, old prejudices, and old certainties, and to offer us in their stead new conjectures and daring hypotheses. Science is valued for its liberalizing influence—as one of the greatest of the forces that make for human freedom.”

Here, Popper underlines the importance of treating science and scientific discoveries not simply as instruments to further develop self-contained theories, but as truths that help people better understand the real, physical world. By attempting to confine science within the realm of theory, physicists and other scientists are actually the ones philosophizing and being dogmatic.

“[T]he point is that by neglecting falsification, and stressing application, instrumentalism proves to be as obscurantist a philosophy as essentialism.”

Popper criticizes instrumentalism for avoiding The Dilemma of Objective Truth. Instrumentalism proposes that science should not attempt to probe difficult existential questions, but should instead focus on creating tools for humanity to use. By doing so, it avoids falsification. This is a problem for Popper because science can only advance if it encourages growth, and growth cannot be achieved by only searching for confirmation.

“My thesis is that what we call ‘science’ is differentiated from the older myths not by being something distinct from a myth, but by being accompanied by a second-order tradition—that of critically discussing the myth.”

This is one of the main theses of Conjectures of Refutations: Popper argues that science is fundamentally better at predicting the environment and the universe because it embraces The Importance of Refutation and Criticism. In doing so, whenever a contradiction or irregularity happens, science allows itself to course-correct and grow.

“Thus the creation of traditions plays a role similar to that of theories. Our scientific theories are instruments by which we try to bring some order into the chaos in which we live so as to make it rationally predictable.”

Although traditions are not always based on scientific fact, Popper believes they are useful in serving the purpose of bringing order and routine to people’s lives. Without traditions, people have no points of reference for making basic decisions. Thus, Popper is weary of people claiming they must be completely destroyed in the name of scientific or social revolution, instead arguing for The Role of Tradition and Creativity in Science.

“A false theory may be as great an achievement as a true one. And many false theories have been more helpful in our search for truth than some less interesting theories which are still accepted. For false theories can be helpful in many ways: they may for example suggest some more or less radical modifications, and they may stimulate criticism.”

Popper has established elsewhere that the search for truth is a process of trial and error, and that more risky and rigorous theories will supplant their predecessors. Since this is an inevitable process for scientific progress, it is possible that earlier theories might come to be partially or entirely falsified. However, this does not mean they are useless: Despite their inaccuracy, they could very well be the steppingstones from which better theories spring. It can therefore be counterproductive to value only confirmed theories.

“There is only one element of rationality in our attempts to know the world: it is the critical examination of our theories.”

This is the central argument in Chapter 4 and throughout all of Conjectures and Refutations. Popper believes that neither pure reason nor empirical observation are the basis of rationality, since they both originate from the human senses and the human mind. What makes people’s theories rational is instead critical discussion and attempts at falsification—this is the only method to confirm the limits of the validity of a theory.

“So we can now admit, without becoming essentialist, that in science we always try to explain the known by the unknown, the observed (and observable) by the unobserved (and, perhaps, unobservable).”

Popper believes neither pure reasoning nor empirical observation are at the root of science. Although they are both useful in performing tests or probing the nature of things, both are filtered through the human senses and, thus, limited by the human mind. Since it is impossible to tell whether our confirmed observations truly reflect laws that exist in nature, but it is possible to tell when theories do not match reality, the basis of human rationality must be the falsification and critical discussion of theories.

“One of the things a philosopher may do, and one of those that may rank among his highest achievements, is to see a riddle, a problem, or a paradox, not previously seen by anyone else.”

Popper believes in using philosophy to solve problems. Unlike some of his contemporaries, he does not believe that science is meaningful and philosophy completely meaningless in probing the truth, as this divide is entirely arbitrary. Pure reasoning, which is often practiced in philosophy, can help shed light on previously unseen problems, which can then be tested or explored through an interdisciplinary lens.

“Logic is not primarily the doctrine of logical truisms; it is, primarily, the doctrine of valid inference.”

Popper points out that the purpose of logical reasoning is to prove the validity of inferences and to assist people in using them correctly. This is because much of human reasoning relies on being able to make reliable assumptions based on defined premises. If logical inferences cannot be made, then the entire system of rational reasoning breaks down.

“Our idea of approximation of truth, or of verisimilitude, has the same objective character and the same ideal or regulative character as the idea of objective or absolute truth. It is not an epistemological or an epistemic idea—no more than truth or content.”

Popper acknowledges The Dilemma of Objective Truth but defends the importance of believing in objective truth for the sake of scientific growth. He arrives at this conclusion by arguing that verisimilitude—the measurement of truth content in a statement (See: Index of Terms)—is not much different from objective truth. It is difficult to prove that an objective truth exists, but it is not quite as difficult to see that some statements hold more truth than others. Since verisimilitude is an approximation of truth and not so different in character from objective truth, it is possible to substitute the two in the process of testing the truth content of theories.

“And conversely, every language adequate for science must contain words whose meaning is not given in an enumerative way. Or, as we may say, every scientific language must make use of genuine universals, i.e. of words, whether defined or undefined, with an indeterminate extension, though perhaps with a reasonably definite intentional ‘meaning.’”

Here, Popper attempts to prove that creating a language free of supposed meaninglessness is a futile effort. It is impossible to reduce language to factual statements, as even the more basic statements include assigned meaning (i.e., genuine universals).

“Acceptability in science depends, not upon anything like a truth-surrogate, but upon the severity of tests.”

Popper reaffirms the necessity of performing tests to assess the truth content of a scientific theory. It is not the quantity of instances of confirmation of a theory that makes it valid, but the attempts at falsification. The more a theory can withstand severe tests, the higher its truth content. This passage also reinforces The Importance of Refutation and Criticism in Popper’s thought.

“If the method of trial and error is developed more and more consciously, then it begins to take on the characteristic features of ‘scientific method.’”

Trial and error is the primary way to yield theories that reflect a more accurate understanding of the world. The process of formulating a hypothesis and then testing it out has often led to accidental discoveries, and it is a fundamental ingredient in evolution. In this passage, Popper suggests that intentionally making use of trial and error is a core aspect of the scientific method.

“I consider historicism to be the relic of an ancient superstition, even though the people who believe in it are usually convinced that it is a very new, progressive, revolutionary, and scientific theory.”

Popper defines “Historicism” as the belief that the future of mankind can be predicted if enough is understood about human nature. Popper points out that Marxists not only defend this belief, but argue that the process is deeply scientific. Popper objects to this because predictions for human historical development are different from scientific predictions. Popper criticizes historicism as being no different from superstition.

“The theory of revolution overlooks the most important aspect of social life—that what we need is not so much good men as good institutions.”

Popper believes that humans are moral but stupid: They more often than not want to do the right thing, but might not have the necessary information to make decisions that will bring about their good intentions. This is why he believes in having robust institutions, such as a legal system, to protect people with due procedure.

“It [public opinion] is dangerous as an arbiter of taste, and unacceptable as an arbiter of truth. But it may sometimes assume the role of an enlightened arbiter of justice.”

In relation to the previous quote, Popper also points out that people might have good intentions but their reasoning may not reflect the truth. Thus, an opinion held by the majority is not necessarily accurate. The vox populi is not a good measurement for truth, though it can at times reflect a higher sense of justice.

“In brief, it is my thesis that human misery is the most urgent problem of a rational public policy and that happiness is not such a problem.”

Popper argues that the government and public policy should not be concerned with how to generate greater happiness, because happiness takes on a different shape for everyone. Instead, public policy should focus on the decreasing of human misery, which manifests similarly for everyone.

“The main troubles of our time—and I do not deny that we live in troubled times—are not due to our moral wickedness, but, on the contrary, to our often misguided moral enthusiasm: to our anxiety to better the world we live in.”

In this quote, Popper is mainly referring to the troubles caused by Marxism and nationalism. He argues that both ideologies have produced incredible human suffering. Stalin’s Marxist regime was brutal and violent, and the very concept of national self-determination is a fantasy. Both are based on untenable theories and thus produce violent, tyrannical regimes attempting to impose this false reality.