The Antichrist

“The fact is that Nietzsche had no interest whatever in the delusions of the plain people—that is, intrinsically. It seemed to him of small moment what they believed, so long as it was safely imbecile. What he stood against was […] the pollution and crippling of the superior minority by intellectual diseases from below.”

Mencken argues against the common belief that Nietzsche intended for Christianity to be destroyed altogether. He contends that Nietzsche’s elitism made him apathetic to the common people’s beliefs. Nietzsche’s primary concern was that the “delusions” of these people grew to influence the philosophical elite, chaining them to Christian morality when they should have been given license to explore intellectual power free from morals.

“Democracy and free speech are not facets of one gem; democracy and free speech are eternal enemies. But in any battle between an institution and an idea, the idea, in the long run, has the better of it.”

Mencken offers his own take on Nietzsche’s elitism, arguing that simply standing by democracy and calling it sacred is not enough; logic must enter the discussion. He laments democracy disallowing arguments against itself, caving to mob rule when the intellectually strong—such as Nietzsche—should be given leeway. He argues that this is why Nietzsche’s works were so despised by democrats, even though this hatred only strengthened his arguments.

“And beneath the […] plutocracy, the sublimated bourgeoisie, there the immemorial proletariat, I venture to guess, will roar on, endlessly tortured by its vain hatreds and envies […] It seems to me very likely that, in this proletariat, Christianity will continue to survive. It is nonsense, true enough, but it is sweet.”

Mencken outlines a social hierarchy much like the one Nietzsche discusses near the end of The Antichrist. At the top of Mencken’s hierarchy, the fearless intellectuals Nietzsche championed will continue to thrust the species forward, while a powerful “plutocracy” rules over the proletariat in their stead. Within the proletariat, Mencken believes Christianity will continue its work even if The Antichrist’s goal is met, as the religion functions to further stoke the pettiness “inherent” to common people.

“He must have […] the will to economize in the grand manner—to hold together his strength, his enthusiasm… Reverence for self; love of self; absolute freedom of self…”

Nietzsche describes the qualities of the “most rare of men” to whom The Antichrist is dedicated (whom he later labels as Hyperboreans). He describes these individuals as having freed their minds from morality and notions of humility for humility’s sake. In addressing these individuals in his preface, Nietzsche indirectly warns against the misinterpretation of his words by lesser minds, as he believes they will either think his ideas evil or seek to cheapen them.

“We are Hyperboreans […] Beyond the North, beyond the ice, beyond death—our life, our happiness… We have discovered that happiness; we know the way; we got our knowledge of it from thousands of years in the labyrinth.”

Nietzsche names his elite thinkers and argues that their intellectual power is beyond that of common people—allegorizing it in a mythological people. He believes the Hyperboreans earned their superiority through great struggle, which he equates to a “labyrinth”—a reference to the Labyrinth of Greek mythology. The phrase “beyond the North” may also be a reference to northern European traditions and nationalism, which the Hyperboreans also overcame.

“Not contentment, but more power; not peace at any price, but war; not virtue, but efficiency (virtue in the Renaissance sense, virtu, virtue free of moral acid).”

Nietzsche describes Hyperborean morality: He believes the Hyperboreans seek to overcome all that hold them back and do not compromise themselves for an ideal of peace for peace’s sake. He also expresses love for the Renaissance thinkers, setting up his later argument that Renaissance morality came close to embracing Hyperborean morality.

“I have drawn back the curtain from the rottenness of man. This word […] is used—and I wish to emphasize the fact again—without any moral significance. […] I understand rottenness in the sense of décadence: my argument is that all the values on which mankind now fixes its highest aspirations are décadence-values.”

Nietzsche offers The Antichrist’s thesis and names the negative human quality he plans to critique. His definition of décadence is that it values what acts against one’s own self-interest. Nietzsche argues that Christian values are décadence-values—making the Western world increasingly décadent as Christianity dominates it.

“So long as the priest, that professional denier, calumniator and poisoner of life, is accepted as a higher variety of man, there can be no answer to the question, What is truth?”

Here, “priest” is an alternative term for “theologian,” the type of anti-intellectual Nietzsche believes is most responsible for promoting Christian décadence in the world. He believes that in the West, these theologians are seen as the pinnacle of morality, largely due to their corrupting followers. He argues that so long as these theologians are allowed to maintain power—not only over society, but the best individuals within society—any quest for truth will be corrupted by their influence.

“A virtue must be our invention; it must spring out of our personal need and defence. In every other case it is a source of danger. That which does not belong to our life menaces it; a virtue which has its roots in mere respect for the concept of “virtue,” as Kant would have it, is pernicious.”

Nietzsche argues against Immanuel Kant’s famous philosophical idea of the “categorical imperative,” which states that certain moral behaviors are beyond argument as they enhance goodness for goodness’s sake. Nietzsche believes that the very concept of “goodness for goodness’s sake” is immoral, as any such virtue can only serve to act against life. Instead, he offers an existentialist argument that all morality is created internally, arising from a need to protect life.

“The old word ‘will’ now connotes only a sort of result, an individual reaction, that follows inevitably upon a series of partly discordant and partly harmonious stimuli—the will no longer ‘acts,’ or ‘moves.’”

Nietzsche recalls the origin story of Judeo-Christian faith, in which God imbued humanity with “free will.” Nietzsche believes Christianity cheapened the power of free will, which was once seen as the primary tool for humanity to construct an existence closer to God. Instead, Christianity reduced free will to encouragement towards sinfulness—something to be defeated and overcome in order to find harmony with God.

“Buddhism is a hundred times as realistic as Christianity—[…] Buddhism is the only genuinely positive religion to be encountered in history, and this applies even to its epistemology (which is a strict phenomenalism).”

Nietzsche argues in favor of Buddhism, differentiating it from Christianity despite his verdict that it remains décadent. He lauds Buddhism’s lack of supernatural mythologizing. Buddhism, with its adherence to “strict phenomenalism,” is rooted in the living world—and thus stands superior to Christianity (rooted in the “beyond”) in Nietzsche’s eyes.

“Psychologically considered, ‘sins’ are indispensable to every society organized on an ecclesiastical basis; they are the only reliable weapons of power; the priest lives upon sins; it is necessary to him that there be ‘sinning.’”

Nietzsche believes that the concept of “sin”—the dualistic result of faith in absolute “virtue”—is the tool that most effectively cultivates subservience to theologians. By preaching sinfulness, theologians instilled self-hatred (décadence) in their followers. They then offered to guide followers to a realm beyond sinfulness via adherence, thus ensuring that the masses would look to them as superior individuals.

“The instinctive hatred of reality […] The instinctive exclusion of all aversion, all hostility, all bounds and distances in feeling […] These are the two psychological realities upon and out of which the doctrine of salvation has sprung.”

Nietzsche describes the psychological effects of Christianity on its adherents: He believes each of these is born out of an “extreme susceptibility to pain and irritation”—which would be a target for purgation under Buddhism (38). Instead, Christianity encourages ressentiment to forge a foundation of religious love, which dilutes individual instincts.

“Our age knows better… What was formerly merely sickly now becomes indecent—it is indecent to be a Christian today. And here my disgust begins.”

Nietzsche insists that when he judges Europeans and other Christians of the past, he withholds harshness out of deference to society’s ignorance of science. In this ignorance, he finds it reasonably forgivable for humanity to turn to supernatural salvation to escape a confusing, contradictory world. However, in light of science, he finds it baffling and detestable that some of the most powerful individuals in the West continue to adhere to Christianity and Christian morals.

“…this remains—as I have already pointed out—the essential difference between the two religions of décadence: Buddhism promises nothing, but actually fulfils; Christianity promises everything, but fulfils nothing.”

Nietzsche returns to his observation that Buddhism provides a definite path towards its own definition of “perfection” in the living world, while Christianity believes such a path to be nonexistent save in the world beyond. Buddhism “promises nothing” because it encourages followers to overcome suffering via their own willpower. Christianity “promises everything” because its priests offer eternal salvation for the simple exchange of following certain behaviors—including adherence to their superiority.

“Paul simply shifted the centre of gravity of that whole life to a place behind this existence—in the lie of the “risen” Jesus. At bottom, he had no use for the life of the Saviour—what he needed was the death on the cross, and something more.”

Nietzsche attacks the Resurrection as nothing more than a lie promoted by early Christian theologians and evangelists—specifically Saint Paul the Apostle. He believes Paul used the Resurrection to add a requisite supernaturalism to Christ’s life and to create the Christian Church. In doing so, Paul “cheated” humanity of Christ’s life and teachings, focusing instead on his death.

“Nowadays no one has courage any more for special rights, for the right of dominion, for feelings of honourable pride in himself and his equals […] The aristocratic attitude of mind has been undermined by the lie of the equality of souls.”

Nietzsche laments the Christian promotion of “equal rights” as having destroyed the power of the Hyperboreans. He believes the Hyperboreans should be free to exert their power, be accorded “special rights” in accordance to their abilities, and be able to take pride in their accomplishments. Instead, he believes Christianity reduced them to seeing the proletariat as equals—thus forcing them to dilute their own power.

“Moral: every word that comes from the lips of an ‘early Christian’ is a lie, and his every act is instinctively dishonest—all his values, all his aims are noxious, but whoever he hates, whatever he hates, has real value… The Christian, and particularly the Christian priest, is thus a criterion of values.”

Nietzsche studied the Bible closely (in particular, the Gospels and books that laid the foundation for the Christian Church) and found nothing of value. He believes Christ’s teachings were harmless, but serve no greater purpose. Outside of these teachings, the Bible’s values are so deplorable to him that he is inclined to use them as a satirical guide to genuine values.

“Such a religion as Christianity, which does not touch reality at a single point […] must be inevitably the deadly enemy of the ‘wisdom of this world,’ which is to say, of science.”

Nietzsche contends that Christianity and science—the latter of which grew in breadth preceding The Antichrist’s publication—are diametrically opposed on moral grounds. Christianity, with its focus on death and the supernatural, places no inherent value on life and is firmly rooted outside of reality. To Nietzsche, science endeavors to glorify life and reality, using tools available within reality itself to unveil new discoveries that make Christian supernaturalism obsolete.

“The complete lack of psychological cleanliness in the priest—revealed by a glance at him—is a phenomenon resulting from décadence […] ‘Faith’ means the will to avoid knowing what is true.”

Nietzsche believes his will to power is reversed in theologians. Instead of attempting to overcome the influences that limit them, the latter promote supplication—even when instinct demands otherwise. It is this insistent supplication that prevents theologians from approaching actual truth.

“What I here mean by philology is, in a general sense, the art of reading with profit—the capacity for absorbing facts without interpreting them falsely, and without losing caution, patience and subtlety in the effort to understand them.”

Nietzsche discusses his favorite science, philology, and reenvisions it as a mode of literary critique. He believes theologians are incapable of objective criticism because they must always defer to a Christian lens when approaching literary works. The Hyperboreans, on the other hand, are capable of discarding Christianity or any other lens in order to absorb texts holistically, and so achieve greater understanding.

“Is the cross, then, an argument?”

Nietzsche critiques the Christian fixation on martyrdom as the ultimate display of virtue. He believes one dying in the name of a cause does nothing to prove the cause more righteous—it only showcases the martyr’s affinity for death and performance. This statement forms the basis of Nietzsche’s critique of “conviction,” or the dependence on certitude over logic and patient skepticism.

“The order of castes, the order of rank, simply formulates the supreme law of life itself […] the inequality of rights is essential to the existence of any rights at all.—A right is a privilege.”

In his review of the Manusmriti, Nietzsche outlines his belief in a caste system based on individuals’ capabilities. As such, he cannot condone the concept of “equal rights.” “Rights,” as the democrat views them, are a categorical imperative that must be distributed equally. Nietzsche denies the existence of categorical imperatives, believing “rights” are simply “privileges” under a different name.